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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
B R I G H A M G.. HOLBROOK and
BETTY HOLBROOK, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

WILLIAM M. HODSON and ROSE B.
HODSON, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

11767

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
'Dhis was an action for specific performance of a contract for sale of apartment house and adjoining duplex in
SaI,t Lake City, Utah, based on an Earnest Money Receipt
and Agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court held ,specific performance not appropriate and awarded damages in the form of return of
earnest money deposit down payment from escrow, $800.00
per month for one year, value of washer-dryer, attorney's
fees and interest.

2

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversa l of the judgment of the District Court that the contract was sufficiently certain to be
enforceable, of the judgment that appellants were in default :by refusal to perform and new rtrial in the calculation
of damages and in denying the motion for new trial.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Plaintiff, Brigham Holbrook, before December, 1966,
was contacted by A. W. Collins, a reail estate salesman, and
engaged his assistance in locating an apartment house
with vacant land which he could improve (R. 121, 166).
Collins was acquainted with defendants' property known
as the Scarsdale on Ninth East in Salt Lake City with adjoining property on which a duplex was constructed and
sought a listing agreement from defendants (R. 141 &
164). William M. Hodson alone signed the listing agreement for a limited period to sell the Scarsdale and the adjoining duplex together at a price of $160,000.00 (Exhibits
,P..22 and 3). Collins woI"ked out a tentative agreement on
the Earnest Money Receipt form signed by the parties rin
December, 1966, (Exhibit D-15). Collins testified it was
necessary to re-write this agreement because "Mr. Hodson
wanted more security before he would su'bordinate" (R.
168) ..
1

Collins ithen prepared another earnest money agreement of which three differing copies were put in evidence
as Exhibits P-14, D-13 and P-1. These were all part of a
set with carbon copies (R. 199) and it appears that the

white is the original copy, rthe pink is the second copy
which came from the possession of defendants (R. 150,
201) and the yellow is a copy which came from the possession of the plaintiffs (R. 90) of which copies were made
and attached to the complaint and copies of the complaint
(R. 90). 'The differences in the three copies are that in
P-14 the initials "WMH" appear opposite Line 21 where
there are deletions, which initials do not appear on D-13
or P-1. The deletion of a portion of Line 21 is the same on
EJChtbits P-14 and D-13 but simply has a line through that
portion on
P-1. On P-14 and D-13 there is an insert above the words "The seller agrees to subordinate"
with the insert indicated following the word "subordinate"
which insert is then crossed out and on P-1 there is neither
rthe insert, rthe indication of the insert nor the crossing out
of the insert.
E:xihibit D-1'5, as to the matter of subordination, provides at Line 50: "Seller agrees to subordinate to buyers
when buyers show financial ability to build a minimum
eighteen additional units." which has a line through it and
also provides at Lines 21 and 22: ''at time of subordination seller agrees to convey deed to duplex" from which
there has been lined out "at time of subordination" and
at Line 22 it is then provided "upon receipt of balance due
against duplex."
In Exhibit P-1 at Line 21 it is provided: "The seller
agrees to subordinate and in consideration the buyer agrees
to give a fir.st mortgage on a United States lease post office
building located at 100 St. Joseph Boulevard, Trenton,
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Michigan. Income on lease is approximately $6,600.00 a
year whioh buyer will assign to be used only in case of default." with other provision in the lower part of the contract as to the mortgage on the Michigan property. On all
three copies of this. December 28, 1966 earnest money, the
words: "When buyer wishes to build additional units" are
crossed out in Line 21. The 'language of the insert aibove
Line 21 has been made illegible on Exhibits D-13, P-14 and
P-12. Mrs. Hodson testified that it related to building units
on :the dupl,ex lot (R. 7 and 200).
Mr. Collins testified that the initials "W.M.H." at left
of Line 21 of Exhibit P-14 were placed on the exhibit by
Mr. Hodson (R. 160). Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both testified
that those are not his initials and that Mr. Collins put
them on after Mrs. Hodson had signed the earnest money
agreements, following the signature by her husband (R.
142, 201, 202).
In other respects there isn't much controversy about
the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. The
buyers offered $147,000.00 with $17,000.00 down for the
Scarsdale Apartments and the duplex to the south with appliances and furniture with reference to a first mortgage
on the property in Trenton, Michigan. The sellers made a
counter-offer providing for first mortgage on the building
jn Michigan with an assignment of lease and clear title in
the Holbroofus and for release of the mortgage when the
contract "is reduced to $100,000.00 on rtJhe apartment house
at 125 South 9th East and the duplex at 135 South 9rth

5

East Street, both located in Salt Lake City, Utah." raising
the purchase price 1lo $1'50,000.00 wiith $20,000.00 down.
1

The defendants then consulted an attorney who wrote
a letter to the brokers on January 11, 1967 (Exhibit D-7)
commenting on a
Eistate Agreement" marked Exlhibit
D-6 and suggesting a number of additions to and changes
in the proffered contracts.
The plaintiffs signed a "Real Estate Sale Agreement"
dated January 19, 1967 (Exhibit P-4) which was submitted
to defendants and their attorney along with the attached
papers which are a copy of proposed mortgage from the
Holbrooks to the Hodsons, a proposed seller's isettlement
statement, a proposed "Assignment of Leases and Rents,"
a commitment for title insuTance on the Michigan property
from Burton Abstract and Title Company, a copy of escrow
instructions signed by the Holbrooks, a Warranty Deed
signed by the Hodsons and not acknowledged and a proposed Bill of Sale for the Hod.sons to execute covering furniture in the apartment house and the duplex.
In response rto this submitted oontract with attachments the defendants caused a letter to be written to the
brokers January 21, 1967 (Exhibit D-9) purporting to
point out several inconsistencies between the submitted
Real Estate Contract and the Earnest Money Agreement
and suggesting that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
ito Purchase is too indefinite to be enforceabfo and submit'ting a Uniform Real Estate Contract with "Addendum"
from the Earnest Money Receipt signed by the defendants
(Exhibit D-8).

This was followed by a letter from the buyers' attorney daJted February 10, 1967 (Exhibit D-10), proposing a
definition of "subordinate" and demanding closing of the
transaction on rt!hat definition.
In response to this letter, attorneys for the defendants
dispatched a letter dated February 16, 1967 (Exhibit D-11)
and again proposing that Exhibit D-8, the Uniform Real
Estate Contract with "Addendum," as submitted with the
letter of January 21, be the basis for clooing rthe transaction and offering to cooperate.
The plaintiffs went to Mexico for five weeks leaving
the latter part of February (R. 109 and 137). In the latter
part of March or the first part of April, the defendants
proceeded to remove the duplex from the property and
construct an additional apartment house on the lot where
the duplex had been (R. 138 and 145), the progress of
which was known to the plaintiffs ( R. 138) . The Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was recorded by the
brokers on August 8, 1967 (Exhibit P-14) and the complaint was filed December 13, 1967, seeking Bpecific performance and damages or alternatively damages plus attorney's fees and attaching a copy of the Earnest Money
Receipt and Off er to Purchase which appears to be in fact
a copy of Exhibit P-1 (R. 16 to 18).
The answer of defendants pleads that the Earnest
Money Receipt is too vague, uncertain and indefinite to be
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capable of specific performance or to be the basis of any
cause of action, pleading laches, denying breach of the
agreement by the def end ants or refusal to go forward and
pleading that defendants offered to close the transaction
in rthe exact wording of Exhibit A and that after a reasonable time, they had proceeded to remove the duplex and
construct new units on that location (R. 19 to 21).
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart M.
Hanson on January 16 and 17, 1969 resulting in a memorandum decision dated January 20, 1969 (R. 22 and 23).
The memorandum decision finds the contract "absolutely clear and definite," that plaintiffs are not estopped
but are entitled to damages for $20,000.00 paid on the contract, $444.00 for the washer and dryer insta:lled, $160.30
closing expenses, damages of $9,600.00 being $800.00 per
month for one year, together with interest on all of the
said sums and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
were signed by the Court January 24, 1969, mailed out by
the Clerk, January 27, 1969 ( R. 2'5 to 30) with Mortion for
a New Trial being filed February 6, 1969 (R. 31) which
attacked the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The timeliness of ithe Motion for New Trial has been
before the Court previously and will not be considered in
this brief, although the cross-appeal of the plainrtiffo challenges the timeliness as well as the sufficiency of the damages awarded (R. 49) ..

POINTS RELIED ON

For Reversal of the Trial Court
1. The Earnest Money Receipt is so uncertain and
indefinite as to be unenforceable.

2. Pla!intiffs made no tender in accordance with the
Earnest Money Receipt.
3. Defendants did not breach the Earnest Money Receipt agreement.

In Support of Motion for New Trial
4. The damages awarded are not supported by the
evidence.
5. Defendants are not clhargeable with foss of the
washer and dryer.
6. The initials on Exhibit P-14 are not the initials of
defendant William M. Hodson.
7. The brokers were the agents of p1aintiffs contrary
to Finding of Fact No. 7.
8. Finding of Fact No. 8 is in error in finding that
the plaintiffs submitted the required papers on January
19, 1967.
9. Finding of Fact No.. 9 is in error in finding that
monthly profit from the apartment hom;e was $800.00.
ARGUMENT
1. The earnest money receipt is so uncertain and indefinite as to be unenforceable.

Defendants, being willing all the time to proceed with
the transaction, endeavored to obtain a clarification of certain portions of the contract before concluding that tJhe only
possibility for closing was to close the contract in the language of the Earnest Money Receipt or else to accede to the
pla:intiffs' interpretations and changes contained in its offer which is Exhibit P-4.
In Exhibits D-7, D-9 and D-11 defendants raised questions as to uncertainty and indefiniteness. These were : If
subordination were required would it be as to all of the
properity or the duplex only and on how much ground; what
would be the use of the funds raised 'tJhrough the sU:bordinatJion provision; if improvements were to be made on the
properties being sold, would the Hodsons have any right of
objection to the plans; was any money to be raiBed for this
transaction on the Michigan property; what would the
terms of subordination be; was the Michigan mortgage to
'be recorded or placed in escrow; was it intended that the
application of the term "subordinate" and "mortgage" as
applied to rthis transaction would be worked out by the
parties in a Uniform Real Estate Contract or be left for
interpretation by a court?

It was plain from the testimony of the parties concerning ithe deletions and the change from Exhibit D-15
to Exhibit P-1, that the parties had discussed :with the real
estate agent the matters of what property was to be subordinwted to other money, what the proceeds of the first
lien were to be used for and how the Michigan property
could be used as additional security in some manner. And
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the Earnest Money Agreement contemplated that it would
be superseded by a further contract. These further clarifications could presumably include the amount of money
to be raised to which the Hodsons would subordinate, the
terms of re-payment of that money, the use of the money
to be raised and the type of improvemeruts, if any, which
were to be made on the property being sold, and how the
security of the Michigan property was to relate to the payment of the original contract and to the payment of the
debt to which there would be subordination. Mr. Hodson
very appropriately negatived the notion that he .would receive $11,000.00 on a $150,000.00 transaction and giive a
deed and then run the risk that further financing would
jeopardize his $130,000.00 equity with no protection wh:aJtsoever as to how the money would be used, what it would
do to his property, and whether he would end up with anything except a $50,000.00 property in Michigan to ta.Ike the
place of his $130,000.00 balance (R. 136).
These matters of uncertainty and indefiniteness were
such that the contract was not specifioally enforceable and
plaintiffs' remedy was to seek relief for unjust enrichment
of the defendants, if any.
In Kessler v. Sapp (Cal. Ct. of App. 1959) 338 Pac.
2d 34, 37, the Court ruled that a contract for the purchruse
of unimproved property for ,subdivision purposes was too
indefinite to support an action for specific performance
where the escrow instructions provided for subordination
of a trust deed to a first trust to be obtained by purchasers,
and only the amount was determinable from the contract.

11

The rate of interest, :the amount of monthly payments and
the period of debt were 1eft to future agreement of the
parties. As to the agreement to subordinate the deed of
trust to a first truist deed for ,a construction loan, the Court
stated:
"The escrow instructions of January 20 provided
for the subordination of a trust deed to a first trust
deed to be obtained by the purchasers, only one
term of the contemplated deed of trust was set out
in the instructions, namely, that the amount of encumbrance was not to exceed $6.50 per square foot,
'exclusive of garages, stairways and porches,' * * *
the rate of interset, the amount of monthly payments and the period of the debt were left to future
agreement of the parties. This radical uncertainty
as to a material feature of sales agreement not only
rendered it incapable of specific performance
(Gould v. Cal"lan, 127 Cal. App. 2d, 1, 273 Pac. 2d
93) but also rendered unmaintainable an action for
damages for its breach. Burgess v. Rodom, 12 Cal.
App. 2d 71, 262 Pac. 2d 335."
The Court, however, found a claim had been stated for
unjust enrichment and said that a purchaser who has paM
a portion of the purcihase price under contract for sale of
real prope:rity, which is void for uncertainty, may recover
his payments in accordance with assumpsit citing Poetker
v. Dyck, 83 Cal. App. 771, 257 Pare. 185; Harwell v. Reininger, 123 Cal. App. 485, 11 Pac. 2d 421. The Court remarked that with respect to $4,000.00 spent by plaintiff in
obtaining the approval of a subdivision plan, such expenditures were not recoverable. The Cou:rit remarked that as
a general rule a purchaser who is entitled to restitution
1

1

may, in addition to the sum paid on a void contract, recover
the reasonable value of any improvements made, or services
rendered pursuant to the agreement which are a material
benefit to the vendor. Restatement of Restitution, Section
53, Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 5, p. 4133
(Section 1479), 92 CJS Vendor and Purchaser, paragraph
571, p. 611. The Court said that services rendered by the
vendee which did not benefit the vendor were not recoverable.

House v. Lala (Ct. of App. 1960), 4 Cal. Rptr. 366,
inviolved a preliminary agreement providing for a second
trust deed of $1,500.00. The Court said that uncertainty as
to the terms and conditions of the trust deed, including absence of rate of interest, length of time it was to run, and
terms of payment, are fatal to a claim for specific
ance. The Court also observed that unsigned escrow instructions do not modify an agreement or make certain
that which "Tas hitherto uncertain.
In Mueller v. Chandler (Ct. of App. 1963), 31 Cal.
Rptr. 646, the defendant appealed from a decree of specific
performance of an alleged agreement to encumber property. The decree was reversed because the writing relied
on was uncertain.

"The writing fails to mention the nature of any additional document which is to be executed, whether
it is a mortgage or trust deed or what any of the
terms of the mortgage or trust deed may be; there
is not even a statement that a mortgage or trust
deed will be executed, but merely ithat rthe note
'may be recorded against my property.' "

The Court relied on 81 CJS Specific Performance,
paragraph 31 (a), pp. 480-483, and paragraph 31 (b), pp.
486-487, from which it quoted.
Similar California cases denying specific performance
for such uncertainty and indefiniteness as exists in the
principal case are: Magna Development Co. v. Reid (Ct.
of Appeals 1964), 39 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288; Roven v. Miller
(Cail. Ot. of App. 1959), 335 'P. 2d 1035, 1040; Gould v.
Callan, 127 Cal. App. 2d, 4-5, 273 P. 2d 93; Conley v. Tate,
38 Cal. Rpitr. 680.

Howard v. Beavers, 128 Colo. 541, 264 P. 2d 858, 861,
involved a contract to e:xd1ange parcels of real estate with
a mortgage to be given for the difference, the statement of
terms and times of payment of the difference being incomplete, so that the mortgage was found so indefinite that the
oontract could not be specifically enforced, with this statement:
''If there had been a mortgage prepared according
to the terms of the contract, then it would have been
a document silent as to the time and terms of payment, therefore there was nothing ito this contract
that could be carried into a mortgage as, if, and
when it might have been given."

The Court cited Restatement of Contracts, Section 32,
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Vol. 1, Section 37,
in 1support of denial of specific performance and then found
that there was a breach of contract because the defendant
refused to perform and granted $36.00 damages incurred
by the plaintiff in viewing the premises.
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Nolon v. Grim, 67 Idaho 13·8, 17 3 P. 2d 74. A lease
gave the lessee a purchase option by written instrument,
requiring a $1,000.00 check as down payment on a total
price of $35,000.00 "upon the execution ru a deed conveying the place to me and the delivering of a mortgage to the
sellers of $23,000.00". It was held unenforceable for uncertainty as to the mortgage.
1

1

In Kusky v. Berger, 225 N. Y. Supp. 2d 797, specific
performance of a contract to lease was denied 1Where the
agreement obligaited the lessee to subordinate the property
to a first mortgage, but made no provision concerning the
interest rate. It provided tJhat a more formal agreement
would be subsequently executed. The Court held that since
a material element was omitted, in that there could be no
implication that the mortgage was to be at the fogal rate,
the corutract was not specifica:lly enforceable.
See also Grooms v. Willi.ams, 227 Md. 165, 175 A. 2d
575; Salisbury v. Tibbetts (CCA 10), 259 Fed. 2d 59; Cl,ark
V. George, 120 Utah 350, 234 P. 2d 844; Banks V. Gregory,
16 Ill. 2d 227, 157 N. E. 2d 12.
2. Plaintiffs made no tender in accordance with the
Earnest Money Receipt.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs were ready,
willing and able to proceed with the closing of the transaction (Conclusion of Law No. 3, R. 27). We submit that the
gratuitous statement made in Court that plaintiff was
"ready, willing and able" (R. 103) must be weighed in
the lighrt of performance. The only substantial evidence of
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willingness to perform is contained in Exhibit P-4 dated
January 19, 1967 and signed by the plaintiffs. Defendants
responded to this promptly on January 21st by Exhibit D-9
1which 'States that rthe Exhibit P-4 had just been received
that day. Exhibit D-9 reaffirms that the defendants "would
perfurm the terms of the preliminary Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase." Exhib'iit D-9 then points out
the particulars in which Exhibit P-4 does not comply with
Exhibit P-1, as follows: The mortgage on the Trenton,
Wayne County, Michigan property had a faulty description; escrow fees are divided and not covered by the Earnest Money Agreement; the conditions of performance would
have to be the conditions of the Uniform Real Estate Contract; hill of sale to the chattels is required by P-4 and not
by the Earnest Money Receipt; Michigan title insurance
was only a mortgage commitment for a $50,000.00 mort:.
gage to an insurance company and nlOt showing any value
of $130,000.00 and no proviaion for recording the mortgage
on the Michigan property to protect the defendants. Extri:bit D-9 also points out that under the usual Uniform
Real Estate Contract the buyer will commit no destruction
upon the premises, the Earnest Money Receipt providing
that when the balance is paid to $100,000.00 there will still
be a "duplex" on the property. Page 3 of Exhibit P-4 contains a lengthy paragraph as to how the buyer 'intended
the subordination provision to operate which refers to
"construction of substantial improvements on the Salt Lake
City property" and subordination to refinancing, the terms
of wblicih are not restricted in any manner and then provision that the promissory note of the buyer complying with
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the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement, without relationship to the first lien, would have to be accepted by the
sellers who would have to "execute such subordination
agreement as shall be required to declare such priority."
Exhibit D-11 written in response to the demand of
plaintiffs' attorney for performance invites the plaintiffs
to abandon their demands not contemplated by the Earnest
Money Receipt and close lthe transaction on a Uniform Real
Estate Contract employing the language from Exhibit P-1
so as to avoid interpretation of that language.
In his Memorandum Decision rthe trial judge found
thait a tender had been made (R. 22).
this
was Exhibit P-4, the disparities of which are pointed out
above.

"It is a good defense * * * to show * * *
that plaintiff has not performed or offered to perform his part of 1t'he oontra0t; or, where a demand is
necessary, that plaintiff has not made any demand;
or that plaintiff's tender or offer of performance
was coupled with conditions not authorized by 'the
contract." C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser, Para.graph 581(a), p. 624.
This was stated slightly differently in Schmidt
333 Ill. 494, 165 N. E. 131:

v. Barr,

"The contract must be enforced according to its
terms or not at all. A court is without auithority
to compel a party to do something he did not contract to do. * * * A party seeking performance must show that he has complied with all of the
terms of the contract at ,the time and in the manner
therein provided."
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In Lightall v. McGuire, 20 App.. Div. 248, 46 N. Y. S.
987, the plaintiff purchaser required delivery of certain
timber spars before proceeding with his contract to buy
2,300 1acres of land, as to w.hlich the Courit stated:
"Upon this single is.sue to which we have adverted
the jury found in favor of r!Jhe defendant, which, of
course, defeated the plaintiff's rigiht Ito recover
damages."
In Arnold V. Smith (Mo. Supp. Ct. 1969), 436 S. W.
2d 719, 723, the Court found that the defendant seller
really did not want to perform his contract and observed
:that the Court will not rewrite the contract for the parties,
sayiing:
"It will require the performance of neither more
nor less rthan that which the parities themselves
have agreed to do * * * 'The party who seeks
relief must show his performance or offer of performance of every eSISential obligation resting upon
h'im before the other pa:rlty may be compelled to
perform."
In General American Life Insurance Co. v. Natchitoches Oil Mill (Fil.fth Cir.), 160 F. 2d 140, 144, ithe Court
reversed a judgment of the district court denying specific
performance, noting that defendant apparently had decided
to try to buy the property '"ait a less price than had agreed
to pay" which attitude the Court said:
"Cannot be heard as in ref using to accept the tender it sought to do, to question as unwise or injudicious the conditions it had agreed to and to
refuse performance because it now thought they
were."
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The Court found it rto be settled law that specific performance requires a contract that is Clear and fair and
completelly performed by :the parties seeking performance.
Plaintiffs, in view of 'these principles of law, were required to bring their lOffer of performance contained in P-4
in line with the Earnest Money Receipt, in response to the
questions raised by the defendants as contained 1in Exhibits
D-7 and D-9 and in response to defendants' final offer of
performance made on January 21 (Exhibilt D-9) and renewed on February 16, 1967 (Exhibit D-11).
3. Defendants did not breach the Earnest Money Receipt Agreement.
The factual basis of 1this argument as extracted from
Exhibits D-7, D-9 and D-11 has already been stated under
Point 2. There is not one word of testimony in tJhis record
to indicate that the defendants were not satisfied wiJth the
price for the Scarsdale and the adjoining duplex. They
wanted the transaction to be closed but were fearful of
losing a $130,000.00 "equity" .through subordination and
default of the pr\incipal obligation, ending up with a $50,000.00 post office in Mic:higan. They had endeavored in
Exhlbilts D-7 and D-9 to outline a reasonable basis to insure
that the improvements on the property 1would be real improvements, that financing obtained on the property would
go foto the property and that the first mortgage, the subordinated lien and the Michigan property would be utilized
in a way to insure the defendants that they would receive
their money from the sale contract.
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Where a contract 1ia accompanied by conflicting interpretations, it is a reasonable solu.ttion th!at one of 1Jhe parties
offer to perform in the language of the preliminary agreement. This was the purport of Exhibit D-9 dated January
21. Plaintiffs' then attorney then forwarded Exhibit D-10
on February 10, which fails 'to comment on D-9 and D-8
and insists on the plaintiffs' interpretations and claimed
representations a;s to subordinaJtJion. Exhibit D-11 was
sent on February 16 in a further effort to resolve conflict
over the meaning of the word "subordfoate," offering to
cooperate 'in working out a satisfactory subordination and
suggesting that if the parties cannot agree, a Court can
inlterpret the language.
"But threatening to resort to the courts to esta:blish
one's rights should not be treated as a breach of
contraot in the absence of an expressed provision
to 'that effect." 17 Am. Jur. 2d, ContractB, p. 901,
citing Didier v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 80 N.
Y. S. 2d 409, affirmed 79 N. Y. S. 2d 521, affirmed
299 N. Y. 49, 85 N. E. 2d 612.
If it be considered that defendants requested a modification of the contract, !then the request for modffication is
likewise not a breach of the contract and could not be so
treated. Turner v. McCormick, 56 W. Va. 161, 49 S. E. 28,
32, noted in Note 14 in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 901.

And in any event, there should have been an explanation by rthe rpla!intiffs of why they regarded the offers of
performance made by the defendants as being unsatisfactory ( 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 801; Williston on
Contracts, Rev. Ed. Vol. 6, pp. 5157, 5159) instead of going

20

to Mexico for five weeks a;t the end of February (R. 109,
137). Defendants interpreted the plaintiffs' silence and
inaction as an abandonment of the contract and proceeded
over a period of several months to remove the duplex and
construct apartments on that ground, all with the knowledge of the plaintiffs (R. 138), who took no step until an
undisclosed letter was written in June, 1967 (R. 94), and
Exhibit P-1 was recorded August 7, 1967.

The damages awarded are not supported by the
evidence.
4.

This point and the subsequent points were raised in
the motion for new trial and, if 1sound, would require a
reversal of the denial of the motion for new trial with a
consequent new trial. The preceding three points, it is submiitted. require that the judgment of the District Court be
reversed on the ground that ,the plaintiffs had not established their case.
Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 26) is that the evidence
shows a monthly profit of $800.00 from the operation of
the Scarsdale and Conclusion No. 9 (R. 28) is that reasonable damaget> "for loss of bargain are assessed as profit
from the apartment house at $800.00 per month for a period of one year, or $9,600.00."
This Findring and Conclusion are contrary to the evidence.
The Sales Agency contract, Exhibit P-3, lists income
of the Scarsdale at $12,050.00 per year and expenses of
$3,966.00 or $8,084.00 net income, which is $67 4.00 per

month, with nothing off for depreciation or obsolescence.
The defendants produced Exhibits D-17, D-18 and
D-19 as befog actual records of income and
for
1967 and 1968. These show that the total income for 1967
was $9,120.75 and the net income was $3,053.12 after allowing for depreciation and salaries and wages, as shown
on Exhibit D-18. In examining Mrs. Hodson the plaintiffs
established the fact that if depreciation and salaries and
wages were not taken out, the net income would be higher
(R. 207). That is obvious and would increase the net income to $5,521.95 or less than $500 per month. But that
is illusory. Ry doing the work of rthe manager and a maintenance man, those expenses could be saved as out-of-pocket
items and by ignorling obsolescence it could be pretended
that the buildings were not getting older. The net profit
would not rbhereby be increased, but the plaintiffs could
have obtained a savings in the form of paper wages to
themselves by doing that work.
Then the coum perm[tted Mr. Holbrook to testify, over
objection, what he though the apartments could have produced under his management (R. 104-108). He testified to
$1,200.00 per month, which was more than actual income,
and figured $400.00 per month expenses, whi0h was less
than actual expenses. He would have saved salaries by
operaJting the Scarsdale himself (R. 108) and again he
would ignore depreciation. His speculations cannot take
the place of evidence of actual operations contained in Exhibits D-17, D-18 and D-19.
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But this type of evidence does not establish the value
of the property. (See 7 ALR 163.) There was no Jtestimony
by anyone that the properties were worth more or less than
$150,000.00, the agreed price.
"Wthere there is no evlidence given showing any
change in the situation, the agreed consideration
will be taken as the correct value of lthe land." 55
Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, p. 951, citing 48
ALR 72 as supplemented at 68 ALR 152.
"Only nominal damages are recoverable unles.s there
is competent proof of the extent of damage, which
would be the difference be1Jween the actual value
and the agreed value." 5'5 Am. Jur., Vendor and
Purchaser, p. 950.
Recovery of loss of profits or of rents and profits
during the period of time that property was withheld from
the purchaser would be reasonable if specific performance
were aJilowed, since otherwise there would be unjust enrichment from withholding of the property.
"Where the breach consists in ithe
of the
vendor to conv·ey at the time agreed upon and his
continued wrongful detention of the possession from
the purchaser, a conveyance having been afterward
made and accepted, rents received by the vendor
during the /time the control of the property was so
detained have been held to be recoverable." 55 Am.
Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, §555, p. 958.
But that rule is not applicable since specific performance was not .granted. Plaintiffs were entitled to return
of ,their money and to rtheir damages, if any, which were
unjust enrichment of the defendants, but for loss of bar-
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gain would be compelled to show that the actual value of
the property was greater than the contract price.
This Court app lied the general rule of damages between vendor and vendee where vendor refuses to convey
in Bunnell V. Bills, 13 Utaih 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597. In that
action the buyers sought sipecif,ic performance of a contract
for purchase iof a motor lodge or alternatively for damages
for the breach. The trial court denied speciflic performance
for grounds which are not made plain in the op!i.nion. It
then aiwarded $'5,000.00 damages for breach of contract on
the basis of evidence that the sale prrice between the parties
was $17 5,000.00 and that the property was sold shortly
thereafter for $180,000.00, making the difference of $5,000.00 as the damages. This Court held:
1

1

1

''The mea;sure of damages where the vendor has
breached a land sale contract is the market value of
the property at the time of the breach 1ess the contract price to the vendee." (p. 88.)
The Court went on :
"Where a rule of law has been esta!blished for the
measurement of damages, !it must be followed by
ithe finder of fact, and to recover damages plaintiff
must prove not only that she has suffered a loss,
but must also prove the extent and amount thereof.
Furthermore, to :warrant a recovery ba;sed on the
value of the property there must be proof of its
value or ev,idence of such facts as will warrant a
finding of value with reasonable certainty."
A careful annotation at 48 ALR 12, supplemented at
68 ALR 137, discusses the elements of damage between
vendor and vendee in a defaulted land sale contract. It is
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plarin, and Appellants concede, that if defend ants breached
the contract the amount paid down is recoverable together
with interest, and the vendee is also entitled to the benefit
of his bargain, which is the difference between the value
of the property and the contract p:riice.
5. Defend.ants are not chargeable with loss of the
washer and dryer.
Brigham Holbrook testified that he placed a washer
and dryer in the 8carsdaie (R. 111). There is no evidence
in the record of the cost or value of the washer and dryer
or their present whereabouts.
There was testimony that the washer and dryer disappeared in the middle of the night (R. 204), wMch was
stricken as being hearsay, with no other evidence as to
what happened to rthe washer and dryer, and specifically
no testimony thait those appliances were not removed by
the plaintiff or in Ms behalf.
The fact fuat the appliances were once on the defendants' propenty and then disappeared does not constitute a
oause of action in behalf of the plaintiffs.
There 'is no proof of value; no proof of loos; no proof
of why these appliances were put :in the Scarsda:le. This
was a gratuitous 'bailment for the sole ibenefit of bailor.
CJS Bailment, sec. 9. To hold defendants would require
proof of gross negligence. CJS, Bailment, sec. 28, p. 418.
"The bailee sufficiently exonerates himself when he
shows that the cause of the loss was a mystery."
CJS, Bailment, sec. 50, p. 527.
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6. The initials on Exhibit P-14 are not the initials of
Defendant William M. Hodson.
This issue was raised by Finding of Fact No. 5:
"All deletions and changes to the agreement were
made prior to signing by all parties on December
29, 1966" (R. 26).
The witness Collins did testify that the changes were
made before signing by Mrs. Hodson in the presence of
Mr. Hodson (R. 160 and 175-176) and that the initials
"'WMH" were placed to the left of line 21 of Exhibit P-14
by Mr. Hodson before signing the documenit (R. 160) ..
Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both testified that lthe initials
were not those of Mr. Hodson and that they were put on
by Mr. Collins at the Hodson home following the signatures
by the Hodsons and without their approval (R. 143, 148,
150, 201, 202 and 203).
Thi1s raises an issue o!f fact with a finding supported
by evidence. It is mentioned here because an examination
of the !initials on P-14 compared with D-15, which are admittedly the initia1l1s of Mr. Hodson, plainly shows that the
initials are in a different style of handwriting.
The Court was puzzled by the fact that his copy of the
Earnest Money Receipt did not have an indication for an
insert above line 21 and follQwing the word "subordinate"
and did not have the initials at the left-hand margin of line
21 (R. 151-152). In presenting this to the Court co "'·e1
stated, "I realize that" (R. 152).

26
This is almost irrefutable proof that vhe fiacts were as
testified by the Hodsons and that Collins was mistaken.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase comes
in sets (R. 199). The top or white page was produced by
Callins (R. 159) and was marked Exhibit P-14, the pink
one (D-13) came from the Hodsons' possession (R. 150)
and the orange one (Exhibit P-1) from rthe pla:intiffs' (R.
90) .. Exhibit P-1 does nolt contain the insert aJbove line 21
or the
at the left. That is because, a..s vhe Hodsons
testified, CoUins obtained Mrs. Hodson's signaiture, which
shows on aH copies, as of December 29, 1966 and presented
all copies to the Holbrooks, whose signatures appear again
below the signatures of the Hodsons and iare dated December 29, 1966. Only two copies (Ex'hi'bits D-13 and P-14)
hiave the arrows, suggesting an insert, in l1ine 21 after rthe
word "subordinate", but only the white copy (Exhibit P-14)
has the insert as crossed out, initial'Ied ·alt 1Jhe left-hand
margin. Mr. and Mrs. Hodson both rtestified that the initials were .put there by Collins after Mrs. Hodson had
signed (R. 142, 150, 176 and 201).
These circumstances confused the Court (R. 151 and
152) and justifiably so. It is plain that after Mrs. Hodson
signed the set of papers and the Holbrooks had signed below the Hodsons, rthe orange copy (P-1) was detached. The
front part of line 21 was crossed out iagain on the other
two copies. (Tihis wa:s done differently on P-1 and on D-13
and P-14.) The insert was made 1above line 21; this was
crossed out; the pink copy was given to the Hodsons (R.
201) and Collins then put Mr. Hodson's initials on Exhibit
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P-14 only. The plaintiffs knew nothing about the inserts
(R. 97, 124).
And the Court was in error in finding that:
"'5. All deletions and changes to the agreement
were made prior to signing by all parties on D'ecember 29, 1966" (R. 26).

7. The brokers were the agents of plaintiffs contrary
to Finding of Fact No. 7.
This finding reads :
"7. On the 11th and 21st days of January, 1967,
0ounsel for the Hodsons wrote the real estate broker
reqesting the changes in the Earnest Money Agreement. There is no evidence that the Holbrooks saw
these letters at that time, but real estate agent Collins did discuss some of the items with Mr. Holbrook" (R. 26).
It is implicit in this Finding of Fact that even though
the parties had not met during aU of the negotiations, the
delivery to the agent of both parties wru; not equivalent to
delivery to the buyers. The Court commented and thereby
presumably ruled that the real estate broker and salesman
were the agents of both parties (R. 154). From this it
:follows thast when the defendants delivered Exhibits D-7
and D-9 to the real estate agents, the plaintiffs were
charged wtth knowledge of the contents of those documents.
The plaintiffs saw the January 11 letter (Exhibit D-7)
before signing Exhibit P-4 (R. 117), saw Exhibit D-8,
which was submitted on January 20 (R. 117), and heard
about problems connected with the Earnest Money Agree-
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ment before January 19 when Exhibit P-4 was signed (R.
119). It is therefore fairly arguable that plaintiffs were
informed as to the thinking of defendants and their attorney with ref ere nee to consummating the transaction.
But even if that were not so, the transmission of Exhibits D-7, D-8, D-9 and D-11 to the brokers imputed the
contents of those documents to the plaintiffs, according to
a careful annotation on the subject of notice to dual agents
appearing in 4 ALR 3rd 224.
8. Finding of Fact No. 8 is in error in finding that
the plaintiffs submitted the required /papers on January
19, 1967.
Finding No. 8 is that the plaintiffs, among other
things, "signed the closing papers" and "delivered the required papers on their Michigan property" (R. 26). This
matter is covered generally by Point 2. But specifically, to
refer to documents prepared in behalf of the plaintiffs as
"the closing papern" is presumptive and inaccurate, inasmuch as the defendants at no time approved the form of
those papers. Likewise the finding that "the required
papers" on the Michigan property were delivered is palpably wrong. The mortgage which was delivered was unsigned and contains no sufficient description and the soctalled title insurance binder is in the amount of $50,000.00
and shows as mortgagee the Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company instead of the defendants, and shows
county taxes for 1965 and 1966 and special assessments
unpaid.
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The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
calls for "a first mortgage" on the Michigan property without specifying what the amount of that mortgage will be.
The mortgage in the amount of $130,000.00 would
that the Scarsdale property was in effect being abandoned
by the sellers and that the Michigan property was being
accepted as full security, although the policy of 1Jrtle insurance indicates a value limited to $50,000.00, with no assurance of a first lien, and the income of the property
at $6,600.00 a year suggests a value far less than $130,000.00 and clooer to the $50,000.00 commitment for the
Northwestern Mortgage.
9.

Finding of Fact No. 9 is in error in finding that

monthly profit from the apartment house was $800.00.

This finding reads :
"9. Figures taken from the listing agreements,
the 'testimony of Mr. Ho]brook, and Mr. Hodson'a
hookis as to rentals and expenses show a monthly
profit after expenses of operation, including taxes,
from the apartment house property of $800.00."
This Finding of Fact is fundamental to the decision
because that $9,600.00 was the chief ,item of damage. The
Court's Memorandum Decision stated:
"The Court is further of the opinion that the plaintiffs should be entitled to a judgment of $9,600.00,
figured at the rate of $800.00 per month for one
year * * *" (R. 22).
which became translated into Finding of Fact No. 9.

As pointed out under Point 4, the listing agreement
and the books and records plainly show a net profit of far
less than $800.00. The testimony of Mr. Holbrook was objected to when he offered to testify to what he thought the
net profit would have been (R. 105 to 107). So far as representation of the sellers were concerned, that is to be
found on the lis>ting agreement (Exhibit P-3), which shows
a maximum of $12,050.00 per year income and annual expenses of $3,966.25 or profit before depreciation of $673.50
per month.
Actual records of income and expenses were available
in the form of Exhibits D-17, D-18 and D-19.
rt was therefore error to receive the testimony of Mr.
Holbrook and error to use that testimony as the basis of
Finding of Fact No. 9 in the face of evidence properly received.

"As a rule, evidence of the profits of a business
conducted on land is inadmissible as evidence of the
market value of the land." 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, p. 425.
"When lost prof.its are an element of recovery in
an action for breach of contract, all facts relating
to the subject matter of the contract and concerning
the execution thereof known to both parties and
all facts which would reasonably tend rto make certain the amount of injury inflicted are admissible.
This may include evidence as to receipts and disbursements for a reasonable period prior to the time
of 'the injury or destruction of the business and a
showing of sales made after a breach or injury, if
such matters would aid in estimating prevented
gains. Where a regularly established business is
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!injured, the average profit that the business is then
earning and has earned are competent proof as to
the loss of profits. * * *
"According to some courts, a witness cannot give
his opinion as to the amount of profits that could
have been made or that the profits ilost were a
specified sum * * *" 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, pp. 430-431.
Defendants submit first, that if plaintiffs were entitled to any damages because of a breach by the defendants, !those damages were the difference between the
value of the property under contract and the contract price,
plus expenditures made to the benefit of defendant, or
reasonably made in preparation of performance. But if
this Court should hold that loss of profits are recoverable
then those profits would ltave to be based upon the experience of business and not the conjecture of plaintiffs, and,
of course, the value of the plaintiffs' effort in managing
the business, if different from the wages and salaries paid
by the defendants during the prior period.
This actual evidence for the year 1967 was available,
which was completely ignored by the trial judge in favor
of the speculative testimony of tthe plaintiffs as to what
might have been.
SUMMARY
The evidence is that the pa:rities and a real estate salesman worked over two Earnest Money Receipts and Offers
to Purchase with the help of in'terlineation.s and cross-outs
as to which the copies delivered to the two pa:rities were
d!iff erent. The defendants employed an attorney who at-
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tempted to work out modifications of the iagreement, which
would make plain their different interpretations and satisfy both parties. This failed and the plainiliffs demanded
performance according to :their interpr¢ations of the Earnest Money Receipt. The defendants proposed closing the
transaction by using in a Uniiform Reai Estate Contract
the language arrived at in the Earnest Money Receipt.
The contract made through the broker ,is indefinite
and uncertain as to the following
material maitters :
,
What subordination was intended and to what kind of
obligation;
What was the relationship of the Michigan property
to the intended subordination;
What was the amount of the Michigan mortgage intended to be, and .were plaintiffs required to show
able title;
When was title to the chattels to pass?
The next genuine issue is which of the parties breached
the agreement or refused to go forward? The burden of
proof was with ithe plaintiffs and the defendants submit
that the only reasonable procedure was to save the contract
by closing in the language used in the Earnest Money Receipt, which was the proposal of the defendants made on
Jannary 21 and again on February 16, 1967..
And if the agreement was definite and enforceable,
and if the defendants were at fault in not acceding to the
interpretations placed on the Earnest Money Receipt by the

33

plaintiffs, then what is the measure of plaintiffs' damage?
'Dhere is no evidence of the value of the property and there
is no evidence that plaintiffs made any expenditures in
good faith in preparation of performance except the sum
of $160.00 (part of iwhich was not well spent as it did not
produce evidence of marketable title) and the payment of
$20,000.00 over to the real estate brokers. That deposit is
recoverable by the plaintiffs in any event and with interest
if the defendants were at fault.
1

If the trial court erred in finding that the contract was

definite and enforceable, or that the defendants breached
the contract, the District Court sihould rbe reversed and directed to dismiss the action.
If the contract were sufficiently definite to be en-

forced, and if the defendants breached the contract, then
the District Court should be ordered to grant the new trial
for a determination of plaintiffs' proper damages, with
instructions as to 'the determin:ation of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
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